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The Least Dangerous Branch: The Dark Horse in American Democracy
Abstract
This research examines the extent to which the Supreme Court has the power to influence public opinion.
There is a good deal of consensus in the literature regarding the influence of public opinion on the
Supreme Court. However, a relatively small pool of contradictory research attempting to turn the casual
arrow from the Court to the public underscores the fact that the question of whether or not a dynamic,
back-and-forth relationship exists is still open for debate. Using a portion of the work done by Erikson,
MacKuen and Stimson in The Macro Polity (2002) as a model, and relying heavily on James Stimson's
public mood data and salient Supreme Court decisions from 1969-2008, this study asserts that the
Supreme Court has the power to influence the public mood on salient issues, especially with regard to
highly unanimous decisions. Consequently, this study suggests a dialogue exists between two groups
that were never intended to speak.

This article is available in Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/
respublica/vol19/iss1/9

RES PUB LICA 145

THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE DARK HORSE IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY
Lexi Baltes

Abstract: Tbis research examilles the extent to Ivhich the Supreme Court bas the pOlver to influence public opinion.

There is a good deal ofconsensus in the literature regarding the influence of public opinion on the Supreme Cotll1.
HOIVever, a relatively small pool of contradictory research attempting to tum the casual armvjivm the Court to the
public tlJJdersc01�s thefact that tbe question oftvhether or 1I0t a t/ynamic, back-andforth relationship exists is still open
for debate. Usitl!! a p011ion of the Ivork done by Erikson, MacKtlCn and Stimson itt The Macro Polity (2002) as a
mode� and relyill!! heavily on James Stimson's public mood data and salient Supreme COtilt decisionsfronl 19692008, this stllt/y asserts that the Supreme COUlt has the pOIVer to influence the public mood on salient ismes, especially
Ivith regard to highly unanimous decisions. Consequently, this stut/y suggests a dialogue exists behveen hvo grotrps that
}vere never intended to speak.
INTRODUCTION
Public opinion carries great weight in the American form of democratic government. A
government by the people and for the people implies the certainty of a back-and-fortb dialogue
between public preferences and institutional accommodations. In order to ensure the government
acts faithfully, certain restraints are in place-namely, electoral accountability and legitimacy through
acceptance. In this way, the public controls the thermostat, choosing the ideological temperature of
the policy produced, enforced, and allowed to stand.10'
The public has tremendous power and influence over the governing of the nation, yet it is
well documented that, at least at the individual level, the public is not well informed about political
issues.'03 But how, and how effectively, is the public calling the shots for a global superpower?John
Zaller (1992) and James Stimson (1991; 1994) explain that by relying on elite influence (politicians,
public officials, etc.) and other heuristics, the public manages to make rational decisions and control
the ideological thermostat in a systematic and predictable way. Public opinion is tied to governmental
action and positions. However,Jacobs and Shapiro are adamant about the diminishing
responsiveness to public opinion. They believe that politicians use the measurement of public
opinion "not to move their positions closer to the public's (as commonly assumed) but just the
opposite-to find the most effective means to move public opinion closer to their own desired
policies."104
This is a dangerous proposition for any branch of government, but what of the "least
dangerous branch," the branch theoretically isolated from the passions of the public and the passing
partisan tides? The interaction between the Supreme Court and public opinion may be both the most
interesting and least studied relationship for largely the same reason: it is the forbidden fruit of
government and politics, the relationship that was never supposed to be. However, in order to
102 Erikson, MacKuen, S timson 2002; Deutsch 1963; Easton 1953; Wlezien 1995
103 e.g. Converse 1962
104 J acobs & S hapiro 2002, p. 5 5
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understand politics today, the question must be asked: to what extent do Supreme Court decisions
have the power to influence public opinion and mood? There is a significant compilation of
scholarship suggesting the presence of the relationship between public opinion and its influence on
Supreme Court decisions, but not much more than defensive, nervous rhetoric regarding the reversal
of the causal arrow. This research, relying heavily on Stimson's public mood data and salient
Supreme Court decisions between 1969 and 2008, seeks to shed light on the extent to which the
"least dangerous branch" can influence the public at a level as fundamental as mood and opinion,
and investigate the implications the results have on the balance of power.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Over 50 years ago, Robert Dahl sparked interest in the Supreme Court's political presence.
He wrote, "As a political institution, the Court is highly unusual, not least because Americans are not
quite willing to accept the fact that it is a political institution and not quite capable of denying it," and
yet, "much of the legitimacy of the Court's decisions rest upon the fiction that it is not a political
institution but exclusively a legal one," (1957). The idea that the nation has turned a blind eye to the
incongruous attributes it associates with the Court only becomes clearer as partisan divide places
increasing credence on ideological position of issues and policy.
There is a good deal of consensus in the literature regarding the influence of public opinion
on the Supreme Court.105 Theory would suggest, in these more polarized times, this influence would
weaken or fade completely as Justices become more fixated upon an ideological stance regardless of
external influences. Nevertheless, in a relatively recent study of cases from 1953-1996, McGuire and
Stimson (2004) found that the Supreme Court continues to weigh their decisions against public
mood so as to issue decisions that have a chance of being enforced.
These findings are reminiscent of Dahl's influential propositions and an ample amount of
legitimacy hypothesis scholarship since then.'OG Recent scholarship suggests that public mood, even
after controlling for the "social forces" that influence both public and judicial mood, influences
constitutional interpretations espoused in Supreme Court decisions.'07 At the very least, this points to
the weighed and measured constraint placed on the Court based on its own forethought and self
preservation. Like other politicians, Supreme Court Justices seem to have a perception of the most
expedient position.IOB There is an established pattern of acknowledgement of, and respect for, public
mood in the decisions of the Supreme Court.

105

J\rIcGuire & Stimson 2004; Casillas, Enns, Wohlfarth 2010; Erikson, Stimson, MacKeun 2002
Mondak 1992; Baas & Thomas 1984; Jaros & Roper 1980; Murphy & Tanenhous 1968; Marshall 1987;
Johnson & Martin 1998
107 Casillas, Enns, & Wohlfarth 2010
108 Stimson, rvIacKuen & Erikson 1995
106
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The presence of a unified voice from scholars regarding the existence of a relationship
running from public mood to Supreme Court decisions cannot be overstated when theorizing about
reverse causation. If the legitimacy of Supreme Court decisions depend, at least in part, on public
acceptance, then it follows that the Court would actively try to pull public opinion toward its
preferences. The idea of figuratively purchasing stability public opinion finds wide support among
scholars of the Supreme Court.I09 Referenced many ways throughout the literature, the term
"judicial capital" will hereby be used to indicate the "funds" used by the Supreme Court. The theory
maintains that the Court can use its judicial capital to purchase the legitimacy of a decision, but at
some point it will run out of capital and have to start saving again. This research is less interested in
determining the way in which the Court gains, spends, and otherwise uses this capital than it is with
advancing the notion that when purchasing legitimacy, the Court might also be purchasing public
opinion. The idea of judicial capital is a foundational theoretical justification that functions to situate
and legitimize this study within the larger body of literature.
Turning to the relatively small pool of research that looks at the influence of Supreme Court
decision on public opinion, it becomes clear that the question of whether or not a dynamic, or
biconditional, relationship between the Court and the public exists is still open for debate. Much of
the current literature concludes evidence is lacking to indicate any such relationship exists.1l0
However, there are flaws in both theory and design throughout this camp of research.
In one of the more prominent studies, Marshall (1987) finds that but for a small collection of
cases, Supreme Court decisions have virtually no effect on public opinion. He looks at the influence
of just eighteen cases using pre- and post-decision opinion poll data. The statistical limitations of
such a design go without saying, but what is more, the eighteen Court decisions used were from
varying issue domains. It is important to note that when researching the impact of Supreme Court
decisions it is difficult to justify looking at individual cases. It is well known that "(policy) is highly
cumulative, the result of a stream of decisions over cime." lll, The Court rarely rules singularly or
finally on any issue, and even when it does, its decision is still taken in concert with decisions on
other issues. Therefore, it is flawed to look at certain isolated hiccups in the Court's discourse and
far better to analyze its influence in light of the fluid voice espoused in a collection of decisions.
Other studies stop shott of actually investigating the influence of the Supreme Court on public
opinion because they conclude that people know too little to be able to systematically respond to

J09 Casillas et. a1. 2010; McGuire & Stimson 2004; Hetherington & Smith 2007; Mondak 1992; Caldeira &
Gibson 1992
lID
Blake 1977; Marshall 1987; Baas & Thomas 1984; Jaros & Roper 1980; Murphy & Tanenhous 1968;
Hetherington & S mith 2007
111
Erikson ct. aL 2002
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Supreme Court decisions.112 People generally lack political information and the motivation necessary
to process and correctly align themselves with ideological positions taken in Court opinions.l13
Therefore, these researchers conclude there is no reason to look further. This study is much less
concerned with knowledge and explicit awareness of Court decisions, but instead asserts that
awareness is not a requirement for potential influence. To believe otherwise is to discount ample
research in the way of heuristics besides knowledge that have been confidently considered to aid the
formation of "appropriate" public opinions, and ignore the reality that public mood may be an
airborne \r1rUS catchable absent direct contact.
Those finding a significant influence of Supreme Court decisions on public opinion114 are
relatively few in number and possess their own theoretical and logistical shortcomings. Mondak
(1992) finds that the Court can increase support for rulings, but at a price. This is consistent with the
judicial capital theory. However, it would seem that when measuring influence of the Court, analysis
ought not be limited to support for the decision, but perhaps better focused on ensuing change of
opinion, especially opinion on the issues about which the decision was determined. Furthermore,
Mondak's conclusions are drawn from a controlled experiment that utilizes hypothetical policy and
rulings, which exacerbates the limitations of the research.
Taking a unique approach, Franklin and Kosaki (1989) also find that the Supreme Court
influences public opinion. However, they do not measure influence in terms of increased support
for the Court's position on an issue. Instead, they measure the structural change of groups
supporting certain issue positions, finding that Supreme Court decisions lead to greater homogeneity
and clearer preferences between groups (1989). Though Franklin and Kosaki view this structural
change as the dichotomous alternative to increased support, in reality, it neither helps nor hinders the
theory advanced in this research; rather, it merely answers a complementary question regarding the
Court-public relationship. They also find that salient issues blunt the Court's impact because salient
issues are those about which people already have well-ordered beliefs. This is significant because the
study at hand looks only at salient issues and cases. Implications of evidence regarding Supreme
Court influence on these issues would seem to suggest that the Court has some power to change
minds, not to simply help form opinions. This study aims to complement Franklin and Kosaki's
work so as to offer a broader picture of Supreme Court influence on the public and offer clearer
implications about any such relationship.
Johnson and Martin (1998) support the conclusions drawn by Franklin and Kosaki, but
suggest even further limits on the Court's influence. They posit that the Court may influence the

1 12

Murphy & Tanenhous 1968
Hetherington &S mith 2007
114
Petrick 1968, Franklin & Kosaki 1989, Mondak 1992, Johnson & Martin 1998

113
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public in accord with the structural change hypothesis, but any kind of influence only occurs after the
first major ruling on a given issue: subsequent rulings have no effect. Tracking single issues across
time, the expectations for this study are fundamentally at odds with the limitations put forth by
Johnson et. al.

(1998).

In sum, a theoretically sound and scientifically verifiable approach to analyzing Supreme Court
influence on public opinion is lacking. The absence of a unified scholarly voice on the topic, and
even on the approach to studying the topic, is not altogether surprising, considering the relatively few
specific inqniries into the idea of Supreme Court influence on public opinion. Furthermore, there are
limitations inherent in the study of an institution with the power to handpick the issues it addresses
combined with the study of a free public whose preferences have only recenrly become well
documented. This research attempts to go some way towards filling this gap and standardizing the
approach through which future research on the topic might utilize, by implementing a new method
that pairs external validity with formulaic consideration for accuracy and error.
After determining that public opinion influences not only Supreme Court decisions but rather
the outputs of all three branches of government, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson

(2002, 2008)

extend the thermostat analogy and turn the casual arrow around for Congressional policy-looking
at public mood!15 as a function of policy and finding a negative relationship. As policy becomes more
liberal the public mood becomes more conservative, or in other words, as policy moves in one
ideological direction, the public has a logical increased desire for policy in the other direction.

Macro Polity model will be

The

employed in this research to extend the analysis of mood as a function of

policy into the realm of policy espoused in Supreme Court decisions.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
The central predication of this research is that Supreme Court decisions do, in fact, influence
public opinion. However, this proposition is not intended to act counter to evidence suggesting that
public opinion influences the Court; rather, it is a supplemental study aimed at uncovering a more
complete picture of this relationship as a two way street. One side of the street is paved, the other
currently in its primitive stages of construction.
In order to test the dynamic part of this relationship, the part that points the casual arrow from
Supreme Court decisions back to the public, I will use the portion of testing done in
that looks at mood as a function of policy

The Macro Polity

(2002, 2008) as a model. In their study, Erikson,

MacKuen, and Stimson create an index by awarding a

-1 (conservative)

or + 1 (liberal) to each piece

of significant (as defined in David Mayhew's two sweep test) legislation! 16, and then taking the
cumulative sum of these scores to create one score for each biennium. Using this score as the key

115 Stimson 2012
116 May hew 1991
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independent variable they run an Ordinary Least Squares regression to analyze the influence of policy
on public mood (using Stlmson's public mood data) controlling for the effects of the economy on
mood, specifically inflation and unemployment indicators. As previously mentioned, their testing
ultimately concludes there is a negative relationship regarding policy influence on mood; thus, a
representation of the thermostat analogy.
Based on this model, I approach Supreme Court decisions in much the same way that Erikson
et. al. approach policy. Looking at Court cases from

1969-2008,117 I consider only salient cases,1l8 and

of those, only cases involving race, religion, or sex (discrimination, privacy, etc.) issues119, There are
multiple defenses for this emphasis on salience. First, it is consistent with

The Macro Polity model,

which only looks at salient policy.'20 Second, it is most interesting to understand the public's
relationship and interaction with the Court on issues that matter most to both groups. Finally,
research has shown that the Court is most likely to defy public opinion on salient cases.'2' Therefore,
in an attempt to look at the back and forth between the Court and the public, it is best to look at
cases in which there is not complete harmony between the Court decision and public preference. The
idea here is that, whether or not the public is aware or has any knowledge of the decisions, salient
cases in these issue domains are the ones most likely to matter, which is different than influence; if it
were otherwise, this study would be irrelevant.
The restrictions mentioned above leave

146 cases

for analysis, with an average of just under

four cases per year. In accord with Erikson et. al., each decision was given one of five scores: -1,

0, 0.5, 1. Negative values indicate a conservative decision, positive values

-0.5,

indicate a liberal decision,

and zero indicates a decision that is neither liberal nor conservative.I22 A score of

-0.5 or 0.5 was

awarded when the decision was obviously narrow in scope or left open the clear possibility of a
different decision given slightly different circumstances.'23 The sum of the scores in each year was
produced to create a cumulative decision score per year.

117 This is a post-Warren Court case pool. The Warren Court is often said to be the most activist Court of all

time-here we look at the influence of supposedly less activist courts. This time period is also convenient, in
that public mood data becomes much more reliable around the 1960s.
118 Epstein and Segal (2000) provide a \.videly accepted operationalization of salient cases to be those appearing
on the front page of the New Ym:k Tillles the day after the decision was released.
11<) These three issue domains are broad enough to include a wide range of opinions, but they are also issues
about which people are not only likely to have formed opinions but those with which they have personal
experience.
120 E
rikson et. al. 2002
1 21 Casillas et. aJ. 2011
122 O
nly a handful of zeros were awarded, and all were cases in which the Court unanimously decided not to
decide and remand for more information.
123
In addition to a single primary coder, intercoder reliability was confirmedwith three additional coders
looking at a random sample of ten decisions from the case pool. There was 100 percent consistency across all
four coders in terms of the ideological direction of the 10 cases and 83 percent consistency as to the value
itself.

The cumulative decision score per year will be the independent variable of focus, representing
the annual nature of Supreme Court ourputs. Implementing Ordinary Least Squares regression, the
analysis will focus on the relationship between this independent variable and the single dependent
variable: change in public mood.124 Stimson's policy mood indicator is an amalgamated index that
produces a single score to represent the aggregate shift along the liberal-conservative continuum of
public mood over time by combining policy preferences of survey respondents across many different
issues. Stimson's mood data is publicly available125 and was last updated in

2011.

It is important to note that the data used in this research are not the raw mood scores. Instead,
for the purposes of this analysis, the value produced by taking the change in mood from the previous
year to the current year is used. Using a change score ensures that the direction of causality suggested
is, indeed, the one being tested. In the form of a quasi-experimental design, we have the mood
measure before the year of decisions, then the experimental treatment of Supreme Court decisions,
and then the mood measure following those decisions. By subtracting the pre-experimental measure
from the post-experimental measure, we can determine the effect of the experimental treatment.
Looking at overall mood as a product of time-lagged decision scores would be a useful avenue
for future research to pursue; however, the change score lends itself much better to the study at hand
for a variety of reasons.'26 Though change scores are limited to shorr term analysis, they ensure the
appropriate direction of causality, as mentioned above. Further, looking at change scores eliminates
the chance that any relationship suggested by the data is only a long-term, possibly spurious,
relationship. Isolating annual change in mood is therefore the best, though not the only, choice of
dependent variables for this study. Thus, the focus of the analysis will ask the question: does the
short-term change in tenor of Supreme Court decisions produce short-term change in mood?
Finally, with the annual decision score as the key independent variable influencing the
dependent change in mood, I also conrrol for fluctuations in the economy (inflation and
unemployment),127 and the ideal point'28 and ideology of the Court.'2' Both sets of scores are given
individually to each Justice. I took the average of these scores for each year to produce one ideal

124 Stimson 2012
125

These data are available at W\vw.unc.edu/ �jstimson/Data.html.

12<> Overall public mood is a cumulative, or developing, score, so to look at mood, rather than change in mood,

the effects would probably not be seen 'without a large time lag. This type of analysis is beyond the scope of
this research given the data collected. The case pool is 146 cases over 40 years, just under an average of four
per year. Each annual time lag would eliminate one data point from a relatively small pool. Future research
might additionally look at cases 10 to 20 years earlier so a time lag could be conducted with more confidence
and thereby add another dimension to the research.
127
It is well known that the state of the economy affects public mood (Erikson et. al. 2002); however, I
anticipate that its influence, and thus its relevance, will be diminished when looking at change in mood rather
than overall mood. Nevertheless, inflation and unemployment variables were included just to be certain.
'28
Martin & Quinn 2002
1 29 Segal & Cover 1989
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point score and one ideology score for the entire Court in each year.130 The Martin-Quinn ideal
point score offers a dynamic indicator of Court preference, with a new score given for every year an
individual Justice serves. The Segal-Cover ideology score, which assigns a single value to each Justice
for the duration of their time on the Court, offers a more stable and consistent indicator of Court
preferences. Thus, we can control for multiple aspects of possible influence of Justices' influence on
public mood that might bypass the Supreme Court decisions.
The expectation for this research is that there is an identifiable influence of Supreme Court
decisions on public mood, but I propose the nature of this relationship to be opposite that of the one
found when at mood as a function of Congressional policy. Whereas there is a negative relationship
between Congressional policy and mood, consistent with the thermostat analogy (as policy becomes
warmer/more liberal there is an increased desire from the public for cooler/more conservative
policy), I predict a positive relationship between Supreme Court decisions and public mood. The
Court is neither a representative nor elected institution, and therefore the public may not attempt to
control the thermostat in the same way they do a Congressional body. Rather, it is plausible, and here
expected, that the public listens to the Court as authoritative and final, recognizing their lack of
control over the unelected body. In this way, I propose that Supreme Court decisions act as a
recalibration of the thermostat, with the public meeting the Court closer to its espoused temperature,
and d,en taking any qualms to Congress from this new playing field.13!
Finally, I predict the level of agreement between Justices to make a difference. When looking
only at unanimous decisions, I expect the above stated positive relationship \vill become stronger. A
unanimous Court seems to put forth a certainty and finality that will be felt by the public. By the
same token, greater dissent within the Court will signal a lack of cohesion, certainty, and therefore
finality that will reduce the malleahility of public mood. Thus, I predict the relationship between

The idea of using the average score of the three most ideologically moderateJustices in each y ear was
considered but ultimately rejected. Though it is true that the more moderate Justices often act as the deciding
votes in salient cases, and therefore the ideal points and ideologies of these Justices have a greater influence on
the decision that ultimately reaches the public, this aspect is accounted for in the score given to each case.
Instead, these variables are meant to control for the influence that the nature of the Court and its members,
outside of its decisions, has on the public. While tIlls might be interesting, it is not the focus of the study and
could potentially cloud the results. It seems plausible that when people look at the Court they respond more to
aScalia than a Kennedy; therefore, the average of the entire Court is what the public sees andwhat they would
be influenced by (if at all) when considering decisions. In this way, these variables are supplemental and help to
control for knowledge of the Court and its decisions-since I do not see either knowledge or awareness as a
precondition for possible influence.
131 How the public responds toSupreme Court decisions is different than how it responds to theSupreme
Court. For the sake of theory, I propose that the public may indeed respond in accord with the thermostat
analogy regarding the makeup of the Court, whlIe at the same time demonstrating a positive relationship
regarding decisions put forth by the same Court. This is why it is important to ensure we are looking at the
decision of the Court absent the influence of individualJustices.
130
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Supreme Court decisions with three or four dissents will be weaker, if it even exists, than the
influence of all cases.132
FINDINGS
The initial analysis looks at the influence of all the Supreme Court decisions in the case pool,
divided into annual units with a single cumulative case score, on the change in public mood. Using
annual decision scores, average ideology of the Court, average ideal point of the Court,
unemployment rate, and inflation rate as the independent variables, OLS determines that we are
explaining 24 percent of the variance, statistically significant at the 0.1 level. In this regression, annual
decision score is statistically significant at the 0.1 level and in the expected direction, with a positive
B-value of .319. Average ideology of the Court and average ideal point of the Court were also
statistically significant at the 0.1 level. It is important to note that inflation rate came nowhere near
approaching statistical significance as a predictor of change in mood,133 thus the model was repeated
without inflation as an independent variable.
In the new model, the independent variables still explain 24 percent of all variance; further,
this explanatory power is now statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The key independent variable
of annual Supreme Court decision score now has a strong positive relationship with change in mood,
and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.134 For every one unit increase in the liberalism of the
annual cumulative decision score, there is a .323 unit increase in the liberalism of overall public
mood, holding all other variables fixed. These data are consistent with the hypothesis.
Brand new, issue specific public mood data is currently being produced by Stimson and his
team. Though the project is in its primitive stages, mood data for two issues, abortion and race,135 is
now available dating back to the late 1960's and early 1970's.136 Issue specific data allows the addition
of a deeper dimension to this research. It is a dimension ripe for exploration that will offer more
reliable results than attempting to track public opinion data using individual questions or cases as has
been done in the past. In order to use these data most effectively a race case decision score and an

132

As a point of clarification, I stand by the fact that knowledge and awareness of the decision are not
necessary preconditions for possible influence. The idea here is that the numerical divide representing the
degree of the dissent need not be known in order to be felt through alternate channels.
133
Lack of significance of both inflation and employment was anticipated due to the use of change scores as
the dependent variable; however because inflation received a p value of . 913, its inclusion may be interfering
with the results.
134
Average ideology of the Court also moves to statistical significance at the . 05 level, while average ideal point
of the Court remains statistically significant at the 0. 1 level.
135 Average ideology and average ideal point were added to the equation with these issue specific tests in mind,
otherwise it would seem the two variables were getting at largely the same thing. The more stable measure of
ideology was added for the very stagnant issue of abortion, and the more dynamic measure of ideal point was
added for the dynamic issue of race. Additionally, it was assumed that ideology would not be a good indicator
for race given the changing ideological position on race during this time period.
136
These data are produced in the same way as overall mood scores as discussed on page eleven, but for issue
specific polling data only. The data are available at www.unc.edu/ �jstimson/Data.html.
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abortion case decision score was created for each annual term using the same method as was used for
the initial analysis of all cases. Thus, we apply a test that looks at change in race mood as a function
of cumulative race case decision scores and change in abortion mood as a function of cumulative
abortion case decision scores.
The setup for this model is nearly identical. However, when looking at race mood as a
function of race case decision scores, the average ideal point of the Court is used as the key indicator
to pick up the influence of preferences of the Justices themselves. Race is a dynamic issue that calls
for use of a dynamic value; both the issue of race and public opinion towards racial issues have
changed considerably over the course of the time period under study. Furthermore, because of the
way the issue of race has evolved, ideology would not be an accurate way to get at preferences
regarding the issue. By the same token, abortion is a static issue;137 neither the issue, nor public
opinion towards it, has shown much variation over time. When looking at abortion mood as a
function of abortion case decision scores, the average ideology of the Court is used as the key
indicator to pick up the preference of the Justices themselves.
The race model does not pass the significance test, with a

p value of .1 03, meaning we cannot

reject the null hypothesis and infer a relationship exits. However, all things considered, and given the
relatively limited size of the data, a more elaborate, long-term study might not be dissuaded from
hypothesizing similarly in expectation of a more fruitful yield.!38
The abortion model, on the other hand, is statistically significant at the
nearly

41percent of the variance

0.1 level and explains

regarding change in abortion mood. The cumulative decision score

for abortion cases is a statistically significant indicator for predicting change in abortion mood at the

0.05 level. Interestingly, though not necessarily surprising, the relationship

between abortion decision

scores and abortion mood is strong and negative; for every one unit change towards more liberal
Supreme Court decisions regarding abortion there is a

-1.27 unit change in liberalism

of public mood

on the issue. In other words, more liberal Supreme Court abortion decisions lead to a public desire
for more conservative abortion policy.
Because abortion is systematically an outlying issue, !39 and attitudes towards it simply tend not
to change much at all, it is actually guite logical that regarding this particular issue there would be a
negative relationship between Court decisions and public mood. People will not simply accept
variation on this issue as authoritative and final. Furthermore, it is important to note that this

137 This is a trend verified by ample polling data tracking the issue.
138 Although we cannot infer a relationship exists vtith ap value of

. 103, if we were to entertain the idea that a
slightly larger case pool might reduce thep value the small amount necessary to infer a relationship exists, then
it would be worthy to note that, looking past the F test to the T test, the race case decision score is statistically
significant at the 0.05 level. Furthermore, the relationship is strong and positive.
139 e.g. Caldeira & Gibson 1992
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negative relationship concerning a generally unique issue does not cause the breakdown of the overall
model; rather, it allows us to theorize a better, more concrete model that looks at public mood as a
function of all of the Supreme Court decisions in the original case pool minus abortion cases.
Rerunning the OLS regression this way, we are able to explain 31 percent of the variance, statistically
significant at the .05 level. Furthermore, the Supreme Court decision score minus abortion decisions
variable is positive, strong, and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. For every one unit increase in
liberalism in decision score there is a .512 unit increase in the liberalism of public mood. These data
go a long way in providing additional evidence in support of the primary hypothesis of this study.
Next, we look to more rigorously examine this story about Supreme Court influence on public
mood and opinion by investigating the unanimity aspect of the decisions. There is a predicted
interaction here, meaning Supreme Court decisions do different things to public mood depending on
a third variable: degree of unanimity.l4D In this portion of the research, Supreme Court decisions are
grouped according to their number of dissents: decisions with zero or one dissents are considered
highly unanimous, while decisions with three or four dissents are considered to be highly divided.
Running the model exactly the same way for only those decisions put forth with unanimity, we
anticipate a stronger, positive relationship to emerge (see Figure 1). In fact, we find the unanimous
decision model to explain about 44 percent of the variance, statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
The decision score indicator for explaining change in mood is statistically significant at the 0.05 level
with a strong, positive B value of .93.141 This is consistent with the hypothesis and is logically
pleasing-the more certain the Court is of their decision, demonstrated through unanimity, the more
stock the public is willing to give the decision.
Finally, in order to examine the alternate segment of the hypothesis we conduct one last
regression using only highly divided decisions (three or four dissents) to detertnine the annual
decision score, and use this as our key independent variable for predicting change in mood (see
Figure 2). As expected, the findings indicate no statistical significance of any kind and do not even
lend a hint of directionality of a potential relationship for future study. In other words, Supreme
Court decisions completely lacking unanimity offer no explanatory power for determining the short
term change in public mood.

140 Here, degree of unanimity is taken solely as the number of dissenters. Though the limitation of this

operationalization is noted-not all dissents, or dissenters, are created equally.

141 Only 39 individual case scores qualified for this grouping of cases. This is a clear limitation, but also suggests

that the data may actually underestimate the reality of this relationship.
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Figure 1: Mood Change and Highly
Unanimous Decision Score (annual)

Figure 2: Mood Change and Highly
Divided Decision Score (annual)
',000

4,",

0
0
"

'"

.rnJ

0

"U
0
0

0

� :,

0

t:>'

"

s

"

0

:e

"

0

Q
{>

·2.1.);')j)

0

,�

(j-

"

.!

il}
�
!:
1:1
.r:
U

�)I

-4,000

0

..,

"'

,
"�

,
•

i�

:lb

3�

4h

Highly Unanimous Decision Score

Table

...

�21J

·lD

,0

1,0

Highly Divided Decision Score

1 presents a summary of all fmdings. We can conclude that Supreme Court decisions

influence public mood and that this relationship is positive. Furthermore, the positive relationship is
strengthened by excluding abortion cases and when looking only at highly unanimous decisions (both
over all cases, and cases regarding a single issue). Thus, there is an interaction concerning Supreme
Court influence on public mood, depending on unanimity of the espoused decision. We cannot
conclude a relationship exists between decisions lacking unanimity and public mood
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Table 1: Change in Mood as a Function of Supreme Court Decisions

1
Decision Score

Unemployment

Ideology

Ideal Point

R Square

3

2

6

5

4

2.028**

2.241**

-2.642**

2.805**

2.592**

1.206

(.323)

(.514)

(-1.270)

(.512)

(.930)

(.257)

.312

.400

-.648

.409

.539

.218

1.216

.863

1.815*

1.193

.994

.511

(.217)

(.150)

(.418)

(.203)

(.221)

(.100)

.187

.156

.467

.175

.204

.093

-2.357**

-1.619

-2.575**

-2.143**

-.152

(-5.655)

(-6.969)

(-5.880)

(-6.404)

(-.456)

-.368

-.393

-.382

-.466

-.027

-1.785**

-1.871*

-1.621

-1.921*

-1.598

(-.546)

(.496)

(-.470)

(-.562)

(-.502)

-.282

.340

-.243

-.368

-.296

.241**

.257

.309**

.443**

.108

.406*

Note:
Each column indicates a separate regression: (1) all cases (2) race cases, (3) abortion cases, (4) abortion cases
eliminated, (5 ) highly unanimous cases, (6) highly divided cases.
*** P < 0.01
* p < 0.1 ** P < 0.05
The t-value is listed first, followed by the B-value in parentheses, and then the Beta Weight.
Average ideology and average ideal point are consistently negative, and frequcnrly significant. This can be taken
to mean that the public can respond negatively to the Court itself but dissociate that from acceptance and
internalization of the decisions.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
This study does not attempt to upend the work suggesting public influence on the Supreme
Court. Instead, the research in this study deepens the understanding of the relationship between the
Court and the public in a way that begins to remedy the cognitive dilemma that Dahl wrote of so
many years ago. The Supreme Court does function as a political player in the American form of
government. The positive response hypothesis, oringinally put forth by Dahl
recendy rejected by Johnson and Martin

(1957), but more

(1998) and others, carries weight in American politics

beyond an attempt by the Court to ensure legitimacy of decisions. Certainly, this research does not
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try to advance the notion of a purely positive response from the public to Court decisions, and even
presents abortion as a counter example. The power of the Court to influence the public may be
limited (or enhanced) by judicial capital, among a number of other factors; however, multiple forms
of testing confirm that the Court can, and does, influence the public on salient issues (i.e. race,
abortion) at least some of the time. Thus, taken together with evidence that the public likewise
influences Supreme Court decisions, we are left with a picture of a paved and functioning two way
street-a dialog between groups that were never intended to speak.
At this point, it is worth reemphasizng the magnitude of the questions asked and answered in
this study. The Supreme Court is a small unelected branch of the great American democracy, and yet
the evidence holds from multiple angles that the American people are swayed and influenced by it in
ways not mirrored by the elected branches. Again, in a study of salient issues and cases about which
most people are said to have fixed opinions based on experience or proximity, we fmd a significant
positive relationship between Supreme Court decisions and subsequent public mood in the short
term. The Supreme Court plays a role in changing (not merely forming) the minds and mood of at
least some portion of the public.
Judicial activism is a term thrown around by politicians and the public alike. Though no one
defIninition necessarily encompasses the term better than another, it is generally thought to refer to
the amount of deference the Court gives to Congressional policy. This study, completely uninterested
in supporting or renouncing the accusations of judicial activism that seem wildly popular in current
political culture, may function to refine the working defInition of judical activism as it stands.
Perhaps activism should not be viewed in terms of deference granted to Congress by the Court, but
rather in terms of deference granted to the Court by the public. Indeed, this would make the Court
"active" in all senses of the word. Using judicial capital to create an artitude of deference from the
American public results in what appears to be popular internalization and acceptance of Supreme
Court decisions, for better or worse.142
Certainly, the conclusions drawn must be viewed in light of the data used in the study: three
salient issue domains and

40 years of Supreme Court decisions for a total of 146 salient decisions

delievered to the American people. Future research might look to extend this study by both
deepening and broadening the case pool. The time period limitation was discussed in an earlier
portion of this paper, but to reiterate, a larger time period would allow for a more confident use of a
time lag, which would add a long-term dimension to this short-term study. Furthermore, opening up

142 Whether or not theS upreme Court puts forth apolitical, or anti-agenda decisions is beyond the scope of this

paper although in this day of extreme polarization it is hard to imagine this might be so.
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the case pool to include additional issue domains would go a long way in solidifying the evidence put
forth in this analysis!43.
Nevertheless, certain limitations will always surround the study of the Supreme Court and
public opinion. Most notably, there is no systematic way to control for the social forces that effect
both Supreme Court decisions and public mood. This problem is greatly minimized, if not eliminated
completely, by the use of change in mood scores rather than raw mood scores, and the use of safety
net economic indicators. However, any attempt to expand this study to a long-term analysis will have
to grapple with the social forces that undeniably come with the terrain.
Finally, further investigation into the notion and workings of judicial capital logically follows
the study at hand. Theoretically, we can explain the evidence of the Court's influence on the public
by way of judicial capital: the Court uses its capital to acqnire legitimacy of its decisions from the
public, which subsequently turns into internal acceptance by the public. A scientific and
psychological understanding of how the transfer from external acceptance (legitimacy) to internal
acceptance (opinion) takes place would add a fluid and confident wholesomeness to the study of the
Court-public relationship. As it stands, the evidence produced in this research already points to a
well-developed, dynamic relationship between the Supreme Court and public opinion. It appears the
"least dangerous branch" is something of a dark horse in the conversation that is the American
Democracy.

143 Public mood is a cumulative index that considers public opinion on many issues (e.g., gun control,

healthcare. education); therefore, a model that includedSupreme Court decisions from as many of those issues
as possible would be best for this kind of study.
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